

# Dose Analysis for Design Basis Accidents

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### **Outline**

- History
- Regulatory requirements
- Purpose of analysis
- Dose analysis basics
- Tools
- Products
- Summary



## **History**

- Siting critical issue
  - Safety & Cost
- Principle hazard Public Exposure
  - Siting key element in protecting public health
- Earliest reactors used containments
- AEC proposed siting on population densities – judged too rigid
- Final compromise dose calculations



4. Site of proposed Ravenswood nuclear plant in New York City. The Empire State Building is at the lower left; the United Nations is in the center along the East River. (AEC Docket 50-204)



### Ravenswood

- 1962
- Availability / reliability of fuel, transmission costs, concerns over air pollution
- East Queens River
- Daytime pop. within 5 miles 5 Million
- Proposed PWR 1000 MWe Largest in world
- Could not meet AEC site guidelines
- Con Edison canceled plant.



## Regulatory Requirements

- 10 CFR Part 100 "Reactor Site Criteria"
- 10 CFR 50.67, "Accident Source Term"
- 10 CFR 50.34, "Contents of applications; technical information"
- 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19, "Control Room"



## Plain Language

- Licensee required to calculate offsite and control room doses following a maximum credible accident.
- Licensees must demonstrate dose criteria are met by the plant design.
- Does not establish acceptable doses, but provides a test for low probability / high consequence events.



## **Purpose of Analysis**

- Site suitability (establishing plant boundaries)
- Control room habitability
- Test safety systems (containment leak rates, filtration systems, sprays etc.)
- Used for new plant reviews & amendments for existing plants (modifications to plant design or technical specification)

### Other analysis

- Equipment qualification (Radiation)
- Post-accident vital area access



## **Dose Analysis Basics**

- Design Basis Accident
- Assumptions / Requirements
- Source
- Pathway Transport/Removal
- Receptors Dose Location
- Criteria



## **Design Basis Accident**



- Surrogate enables evaluation of responses of engineered safety features.
- Intentionally conservative to address uncertainties in accident progression, fission product transport and atmospheric dispersion.
- LOCA, SGTR, MSLB, Locked Rotor, CRDA, Rod Ejection, Letdown line Break, FHA....
- Acceptable methodology RG 1.183 & 1.195



## **Assumptions & Requirements**

- One initiating event (LOCA, MSLB)
- Limiting single failure (typically loss of ESF train by failure of a DG)
- LOOP
- Credit only for QA Cat. 1 components
- Credit only seismically qualified components
- Assumed to fail in worst configuration







#### Maximum credible accident


- Assumed significant core-melt accident releases to the containment... "not to be exceeded" by any credible accident
- TID-14844 1962
  - Instantaneous, primarily elemental iodine
- NUREG-1465 1995
  - Delayed release, primarily aerosol



### Pathways – BWR Examples

- From Source to Environment
  - Drywell Leakage
  - Rx Building Leakage
  - HVAC SGTS
  - ESF Leakage
  - Bypass Leakage
    - MSIV


Overview of the BWR-5 with Mark-II Containment





## Pathway - Removal by ESF Systems


- Primary Containment / Secondary Containment
- Containment Sprays
- Reactor Containment Fan Coolers
- Standby Gas Treatment Systems
- Control Room Emergency Filtration System
- Containment Purge System
- Standby Leakage Control System
- Isolation Valves
- Suppression Pool
- Ice Condensers






# Pathway - Removal by Natural Processes

- Gravitational Settling
- Atmospheric Dispersion
- Decay







## Pathways – Environment to CR


- Control Room Dose
  - Intake of radioactive plume (from outside)
  - Infiltration of radioactivity from adjacent rooms
  - Shine from external plume
  - Shine from reactor containment
  - Shine from buildup on components (filters etc.)



### Receptor- Dose Locations (LOCA Criteria)

- Person at Site Boundary (25 Rem TEDE)
- Person at Low Population Zone (25 Rem TEDE)
- Control Room Operator 5 Rem TEDE

TEDE – Total Effective Dose Equivalent (See 10 CFR 50.2)






### **Tools**

- ORIGEN (Core Inventory)
- ARCON96, PAVAN (Meteorology Atmospheric Dispersion, RG 1.194)
- RADTRAD Dose Calculation
- QAD / Microshield / MCNP Shielding
- SCALE



### RADTRAD Model – BWR





### **Products**

- Confirmatory Analysis
- Safety Evaluation
- Enforcement Discretion



## **Summary**

### Design basis dose analyses:

- Are used to determine what measures and barriers are necessary to protect operators and the public if we are wrong about the plants response to events.
- Use a stylized, simplified and conservative approach documented in RG 1.183 and RG 1.195 (maximum credible source term, transport, deposition).
- Are required by regulation for siting and ongoing assessments of safety systems.



### References

- NUREG-1465, "Accident Source Terms for Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants," ADAMS Accession No. ML041040063.
- RG 1.183, "Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors," ADAMS Accession No. ML003716792.
- 3. RG 1.194, "Atmospheric Relative Concentrations for Control Room Radiological Habitability Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants," ADAMS Accession No. ML031530505.
- RG 1.195, "Methods and Assumptions for Evaluating Radiological Consequences of Design Basis Accidents at Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors," ADAMS Accession No. ML031490640.
- 5. TID-14844, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites," ADAMS Accession No. ML083380438.



## **Acronyms**

- AEC Atomic Energy Commission
- BWR boiling water reactor
- CFR Code of Federal Regulations
- CR control room
- CRDA control rod drop accident
- DG diesel generator
- ESF engineered safety feature
- FHA fuel handling accident
- GDC General Design Criterion



## **Acronyms**

- HVAC heating ventilation and air conditioning
- LOCA loss of coolant accident
- MSIV main steam line isolation valve
- MSLB main steam line break accident
- PWR pressurized water reactor
- QA quality assurance
- RG regulatory guide
- Rx reactor
- SGTR steam generator tube rupture accident
- TEDE total effective dose equivalent



## Backup Slides



### **BWR Source Term**

	NUREG 1465		TID 14844
	Gap	Early In-vessel	
Duration (hours)	.5	1.3	Instant.
Noble Gases (%)	5	95	100
Halogens	5	25	50
(%)	Elemental I2- 4.85		Elem. – 91
	Aerosol (CsI) – 95 Organic 0.15		Aerosol –5
			Organic 4 <sub>20</sub>